Stable Matching Models with Applications to Junior Doctor Allocation and Children Adoption

06.05.2019 17:00 - 18:00

In a stable matching problem, we are given two sets of agents, each of whom ranks some (or all) the members of the other set in order of preference, indicating their level of desire to be matched to each other. A solution to the problem is a pairing of all agents such that no two agents form a blocking pair, that is, a pair that are not currently matched together, but would prefer to be matched to each other rather than to their currently assigned partners. In this talk I will introduce new models for the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists, with applications to pairing children with adoptive families, and for its many-to-one generalization, the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Ties, with applications to the allocation of junior doctors.

Personal website of Sergio García Quiles

HS 7 OMP1 (#1.303)